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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 0 - REMEDIES AND PLEADING
CPLR 3012(b): Retention of untimely complaint for 18 days held not
to constitute a waiver of right to move for dismissal.
CPLR 3012(b) provides that where the plaintiff elects to serve
only a summons, the defendant may properly demand a copy of the
complaint. Thereafter, failure of the plaintiff to serve the complaint
within 20 days of the demand can result in the dismissal of the
action. 15 0 Any such dismissal is discretionary with the court.15' In pass-
ing upon a CPLR 3012(b) dismissal motion, the court must consider
(1) the length of time of the delay, and (2) whether the motion for
dismissal was made prior or subsequent to the receipt of the late
complaint.152
In Johnson v. Johnson,153 the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, affirmed a ruling of the Supreme Court, Montgomery County,
which had granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pur-
suant to CPLR 3012(b).154 The action was based on an alleged breach
of a warranty deed, fraud, and deceit. No complaint was served with
the summons, and the defendants served a notice of appearance with
a demand for the complaint. Four months after defendants' demand,
plaintiff served the complaint. Defendants did not reject the com-
by the Court of Appeals in Ray, has been signed into law and will be effective Sept. 1,
1975. See N.Y. Times, June 19, 1975, at 42, col. 3.
150 CPLR 3012(b) provides:
If the complaint is not served with the summons, the defendant may serve a
written demand for the complaint. If the complaint is not served within twenty
days after service of the demand, the court upon motion may dismiss the action.
A demand or motion under this section does not of itself constitute an appear-
ance in the action.
Unlike CPA 257, CPLR 3012(b) does not require that service of the demand for the com-
plaint be made within 20 days of the service of the summons.
151 When the defendant makes a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3012(b), the
plaintiff, to prevent dismissal, must demonstrate to the court that there was a valid excuse
for the delay in serving the complaint and that he has a meritorious cause of action.
3 WK&M 8012.15.
In the exercise of its discretion, the court need not dismiss the action if the failure
to serve the complaint is unavoidable and no delay in prosecution has occurred. However,
an inadequate explanation of the delay will result in a dismissal of the action. Id. Com-
pare Ferrentino v. Farragut Gardens No. 5, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 815, 316 N.Y.S.2d 673
(2d Dep't 1970) (mem.) (dismissal granted where attorney allegedly misplaced plaintiff's
file and no meritorious claim was demonstrated), with McDonald v. King's Dep't Store,
Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 597, 275 N.Y.S.2d 707 (3d Dep't 1966) (per curiam) (dismissal denied
where attorney encountered research problems and defendant failed to show prejudice).
152 See generally 8 WK&M 8012.15. Although filing the motion to dismiss after
receiving the untimely complaint will not in and of itself require denial of the motion,
it has been suggested that the defendant's motion for dismissal will be muted, at least
psychologically, by such a delay. 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 8012, commentary at 590 (1974).
153 45 App. Div. 2d 899, 357 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d Dep't 1974) (mem.).
154 Id. at 900, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 209. Plaintiff had sought by cross-motion to compel
defendants to accept the complaint. Id. at 899, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
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plaint nor make a CPLR 3012(b) motion to dismiss until 18 days after
its receipt.
The issue presented to the Third Department was whether the
18-day retention of the complaint by defendants constituted a waiver
of their rights under GPLR 3012(b).155 Arguably, defendants' reten-
tion of the complaint could be considered a waiver, as well as the
equivalent of granting plaintiff an extension of the statutory time limit
for service.'"0 However, the court rejected this reasoning and affirmed,
as a reasonable exercise of the lower court's discretion, the dismissal
of the action. In a memorandum decision, the appellate court stated
that in view of the inordinate delay on the plaintiffs part, retention
by defendants for 18 days did not constitute a waiver of their rights.157
A seemingly contradictory position was taken by the Fourth
Department in Lucenti v. City of Buffalo, 58 wherein defendant's
motion for dismissal was denied, despite plaintiff's nearly three-year
delay in serving the complaint. Defendant received the late complaint
while its motion to dismiss was pending, but failed to reject it. Instead,
the complaint was included as part of defendant's record on ap-
peal. In a memorandum decision, the court concluded that the "reten-
tion of the complaint was a waiver of the untimely service thereof and
deprived defendant of the right to relief under GPLR 3012."' i9
The seemingly contradictory holdings in Johnson and Lucenti
can, in some measure, be reconciled through an examination of the
facts surrounding each case. The defendant in Lucenti failed to reject
the complaint received while his motion to dismiss under CPLR
3012(b) was pending. Having retained the complaint, the defendant
was in a poor position to continue to seek relief for plaintiff's failure
155 Plaintiff's attorney argued that a delay of three or four months in issuing the
complaint was the general practice of attorneys in the area. The court rejected this
reasoning, stating that such a custom was inadequate grounds for "ignoring the require-
ments of the CPLR." Id. at 899, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
256 Id.
157 Id.
158 29 App. Div. 2d 833, 287 N.Y.S.2d 612 (4th Dep't 1968) (mem), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 302, 322 (1968).
159 29 App. Div. 2d at 834, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 613, citing Graziano v. Albanese, 24 App.
Div. 2d 712, 263 N.Y.S.2d 20 (lst Dep't 1965) (per curiam) (prompt rejection of untimely
complaint resulted in dismissal of the action); Wakschal v. Century Estates, Inc., 10 App.
Div. 2d 891, 201 N.Y.S.2d 236 (2d Dep't 1960) (mem.) (action dismissed due to unexplained
delay of over two years in the service of the complaint); Burns v. Meister, 141 App. Div.
674, 125 N.Y.S. 916 (2d Dep't 1910) (motion requesting leave to serve a complaint denied
where original untimely complaint was promptly returned); Rogers v. Rockwood, 59 Hun
628, 13 N.Y.S. 939 (Sup. Ct. 5th Dep't 1891) (retention of the complaint constituted a
waiver of the irregularity in the method of service).
1975]
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to serve a timely complaint. In Johnson, however, the defendants'
rejection of the untimely complaint, although it did not immediately
follow receipt of the complaint, was sufficiently prompt to avoid a
waiver of their rights under CPLR 3012(b).160
The Johnson decision suggests that the Third Department will
not be hasty in concluding that a defendant who does not immediately
return an untimely complaint has thereby waived his objection to
such late service. Regrettably, Johnson, like previous decisions,161 fails
to articulate a standard by which trial courts can determine if defen-
dants have waived their rights under CPLR 3012(b). This is partic-
ularly unfortunate in view of the discretion vested in a court in passing
upon a motion under CPLR 3012(b).1 62 Hopefully, appellate courts
in the near future will set forth guidelines to assist trial courts in
evaluating such motions.
The need for sound judicial discretion in this area is highlighted
by an examination of the consequences that proceed from a dismissal
pursuant to CPLR 3012(b). Such a dismissal results in the entry of a
default judgment.163 Moreover, since a CPLR 3012(b) dismissal has
been held to constitute a "neglect to prosecute,"' 64 the plaintiff is not
entitled to the six-month extension of the statute of limitations pro-
vided for in CPLR 205(a).165 Finally, while a dismissal pursuant to
CPLR 3012(b) has the same effect as a dismissal for neglect to prose-
cute under CPLR 3216, the plaintiff is not entitled to the preliminary
160 Cf. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3012, commentary at 590 (1974), wherein a similar ratio-
nale was suggested as a possible distinction between Lucenti and Wilkening v. Fogarty,
40 App. Div. 2d 1031, 338 N.Y.S.2d 985 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.). In Wilkening, the com-
plaint was served almost 30 months after the summons and defendant returned it within
a week of its receipt. Moreover, plaintiffs did not offer a reasonable excuse for the delay
and failed to file an affidavit of merits. The Second Department held that under these
circumstances, defendant's motion to dismiss should have been granted. Id., 338 N.Y.S.2d
at 986.
161 See cases cited note 159 supra.
162 See note 151 and accompanying text supra.
168 3 WK.&M J 3012.15.
There is authority to the effect that dismissal under CPLR 3012(b) requires no show-
ing by the defendant of prejudice stemming from the untimely service of the complaint.
See Kroner v. Flora, 35 App. Div. 2d 835, 317 N.Y.S2d 459 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
164 See Wright v. Farlin, 42 App. Div. 2d 141, 346 N.Y.S.2d 11 (3d Dep't 1973).
165 CPLR 205(a) states that when an action is timely commenced and is terminated
for any reason other than voluntary discontinuance, final judgment on the merits, or
neglect to prosecute, the plaintiff may commence a new suit based on the same cause of
action within six months after the termination. Since a dismissal under CPLR 3012(b)
has been held to be a neglect to prosecute, a suit dismissed under that provision would
not be entitled to the benefit of a CPLR 205(a) extension. Thus, should a CPLR 3012(b)
dismissal occur after the statute of limitations has expired, the plaintiff will have no
opportunity to recommence his suit. 7B MCKmNNEY'S CPLR 3012, commentary at 591
(1974).
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warning required under the latter section.166 Considering the possible
consequences, a plaintiff who elects to serve a summons without a
complaint would be well advised to speedily comply with the de-
fendant's demand for service.
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3211(d): Court of Appeals adopts liberal approach in allowing
discovery to oppose a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
At times, a party may seek to oppose a motion to dismiss a cause
of action where "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but
cannot then be stated."'' 67 In such instances, CPLR 3211(d) permits
a court to order a continuance for disclosure of such facts.168 This
section has proven to be a particularly useful aid for plaintiffs at-
tempting to establish jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.169 Facts
necessary to show sufficient New York contacts to confer jurisdiction
thereunder are often exclusively within the control of the moving
defendant. Without the aid of disclosure, a plaintiff, though diligent
in his search for existing facts, would face eventual loss of his oppor-
tunity to litigate in a New York court.
In Peterson v. Spartan Industries, Inc.,170 the Court of Appeals
considered what burden a plaintiff need overcome to establish that
sufficient facts supporting jurisdiction "may exist." Once having satis-
fied this burden, a nonresident defendant would be compelled to com-
ply with a discovery and inspection notice.
The claim in Peterson arose when plaintiff was burned in New
166 CPLR 3216(b)(3) states that before an action can be dismissed for failure to prose-
cute pursuant to CPLR 3216(a), the court or the defendant seeking the dismissal must
serve upon the plaintiff a written demand to resume the prosecution. Thereafter, plaintiff
has 45 days to resume prosecution and file a note of issue. No such requirement applies
to a motion for a CPLR 3012(b) dismissal. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3012, commentary
at 591-92 (1974).
167 CPLR 3211(d) provides:
Should it appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion [to dismiss
a cause of action or defense] that facts essential to justify opposition may exist
but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion, allowing the moving
party to assert the objection in his responsive pleading, if any, or may order a
continuance to permit farther affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had
and may make such other order as may be just.
168 Prior to enactment of the CPLR, the courts were in conflict. However, the weight
of authority favored interpreting CPA 307 as not allowing an examination before trial of
a defendant in order to oppose a motion to dismiss. Compare Loonsk Bros., Inc. v. Med-
nick, 246 App. Div. 464, 285 N.Y.S.2d 801 (4th Dep't 1935) (allowing a preliminary exami-
nation), with Standard Foods Prods. Corp. v. Vinas Unidas SA., 200 Misc. 590, 104
N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951) (no authority exists for taking a deposition
of a party for use upon a motion before trial).
169 CPLR 302.
170 33 N.Y.2d 463, 310 N.E.2d 513, 354 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1974).
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